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Introduction
Is there such a thing as free will in Buddhism? Do moral and mental forms of 
cultivation at the heart of Buddhist practice imply some notion of agency and 
responsibility? And if they do, how are we to think of those individuals who 
embark on the path to liberation or enlightenment, considering that all Buddhists 
give universal scope to the no- self doctrine? Of course, Buddhism is not alone 
among the world’s great philosophical traditions in providing ample testimony 
for the possibility of cultivating to a high degree such cardinal virtues as non- 
violence, wisdom, compassion, and a general spirit of tolerance. But it is unique 
among them in articulating a theory of action that, it seems, dispenses altogether 
with the notion of agent causation. Buddhists pursue what are unmistakably 
moral ends, but there is no stable self or agent who bears the accumulated 
responsibility for initiating those pursuits, and seemingly no normative frame-
work against which some dispositions, thoughts, and actions are deemed felici-
tous, and thus worthy of cultivation, while others are not so deemed. It is not 
surprising,	 therefore,	 to	 find	 a	 near	 universal	 lack	 of	 agreement	 among	 con-
temporary interpreters about how best to capture the scope of Buddhist ethics 
using the vocabulary and theoretical frameworks of Western ethical discourse.
	 in	seeking	an	answer	to	the	questions	above,	the	plan,	then,	is	first	to	show	that	
despite some straightforward metaphysical tenets, the conception of agency in 
Buddhism	is	less	alien	than	it	may	seem	at	first	blush—indeed,	it	is	not	unlike	con-
ceptions	 of	 moral	 agency	 that	 we	 find	 in	 Stoic	 thought,	 and	 more	 recently	 in	
Nietzsche (2006) and several strands of contemporary moral phenomenology; next, 
to	argue	for	a	solution	to	what	is	widely	regarded	as	a	clear	conflict	between	tradi-
tional conceptions of moral agency and the agent- neutral metaphysical picture of 
causality that we glean from Abhidharma literature. Recent accounts (Flanagan 
2002;	Meyers	2014;	Siderits	1987,	2008)	seek	to	resolve	this	conflict	by	arguing	
that the two pictures are compatible because the discourse of ‘persons’ and the dis-
course	of	‘causes’	belong	in	two	distinct	and	incommensurable	domains.	Specifi-
cally, my claim is that compatibilist solutions compromise the traditional notion of 
moral responsibility and render ethical conduct indistinguishable from merely 
pragmatic acts. The main thrust of the compatibilist move is against the notion of 
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agent causation itself, which social and cognitive psychology has presumably ren-
dered incoherent.1 It is only to the extent that we dispense with such incoherent 
concepts—as	compatibilist	interpreters	of	Buddhist	action	theory	argue—that	some	
notion of moral agency and responsibility can be salvaged.
	 Despite	the	dominant	and	paradoxical	 image	of	the	selfless	Mahāyāna	(later	
Buddhist) bodhisattva (one who has taken the altruistic vow) tirelessly, yet 
effortlessly, working to put an end to ultimately non- existent human suffering 
(on account of the non- existence of sentient beings as conventionally estab-
lished), support for a robust notion of phenomenal agency can be found in nearly 
all major schools of Buddhist thought.2 Indeed, the Eightfold Path program, 
much like the promulgation of monastic rules of conduct (the Vinaya), comes in 
recognition of the complex range of personal and subpersonal factors that are 
constitutive of human agency. Because mental states such as greed, hatred, 
and delusion or, alternatively, loving kindness, compassion, and sympathetic 
joy, can only be made sense of with reference to the person whose states they 
are, they are	 irreducibly	 phenomenal:	 they	 only	 exist	 first-	personally.	 The	
impersonal	 description thesis at the heart of Abhidharma Reductionism (cf. 
Abelson, Ch. 13, this volume) may allow for the analysis of mental states in 
terms of their constitutive factors, but for these states to be analyzable at all, 
and for the attribution of moral responsibility and freedom to be intelligible, 
there needs to be a conception	 of	 first-	personal	 agency	 in	 place.	 on	 the	 view	
i	 defend	 here,	 mental	 states	are	 irreducibly	first-	personal:	 the	 idea	of	generic	
pain	apart	from	individually realized sensations of burning, itching, or stinging 
is thus deeply incoherent.
	 in	 what	 follows,	 i	 argue	 that	 influential	 Mahāyāna	 ethicists,	 such	 as	
Śāntideva,	who allow for moral rules to be proscribed under the expediency of 
a compassionate aim, seriously compromise the very notion of 
responsibility. Moral responsibility is intelligible only in relation to 
conceptions of freedom and human	dignity	 that	 reflect	 a	 participation	 in,	 and	
sharing	of,	 interpersonal	rela-tionships. As critics of hard determinism (the view 
that universal causal necessitation is incompatible with free will and moral 
agency) have argued, there is no threat to human agency so long as we 
understand that agency is essentially grounded in a range of participant 
reactive attitudes and feelings (e.g., resentment, gratitude, anger, etc.) that are 
impossible without the ascription of agency and	 moral	 responsibility	 (see	
Strawson	 1973,	 p.	 11,	 and	 discussion	 in	 Goodman	 2009, pp. 147ff.). But 
bodhisattvas cannot be seen to harbor such participant reactive	 attitudes,	 at	
least	not	once	 they	are	sufficiently	advanced	on	 the	path	 to	understand that no 
beings exist whatsoever as ordinarily conceived. For compatibilists,	 thus,	 the	
extraordinarily	demanding	bodhisattva	 ideal—informed,	 as	 it	 is,	by a steadfast 
commitment to forego the body, its enjoyments, and all virtue for the	 sake	 of	
accomplishing	 the	welfare	of	all	 sentient	beings—makes	a	compelling case for 
allowing special dispensation. On an agent-neutral consequentialist 
interpretation	of	the	Mahāyāna	ethical	project,	we	must	grant	the	Buddhist	saint	
dispensation for the unfathomable and mysterious ways in which utterly imper-
sonal psychophysical aggregates accomplish their aim, while the unenlightened 
must be content with merely following rules.
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 I do not dispute this claim. Nor do I disregard the importance of revising our 
traditional	notions	of	agency	and	moral	responsibility	to	accommodate	new	find-
ings about the sociobiological roots of morality. Rather, I simply caution that 
such revisionary strategies, insofar as they seek to explain agency in event- 
causal terms, may well (if they have not done so already) set the stage for moral 
epiphenomenalism.3 Indeed, on the view I defend here, an effective compatibilist 
solution to the problem of reconciling freedom of the will and determinism 
depends on expanding, rather than eliminating, the complex register of factors 
that underpin the experiential aspects of our moral life. In short, although social 
and	cognitive	psychology	has	significantly	augmented	our	knowledge of agency, 
there is a widespread sense that mapping out human action in impersonal 
terms—a	project	of	significant	affinity	to	abhidharma—has	advanced	only	mar-
ginally our understanding of agency, of what it is like to show responsiveness to 
norms, reasons, and principles.
Freedom, destiny, and the will
As with classical Western conceptions of causality and agency, the Indian philo-
sophical context at the time of the Buddha presents us with a wide array of philo-
sophical	views:	for	(arguably)	strict	determinists	like	the	Ājīvikas,	who	embrace	
a fatalist conception of human existence, all actions are predetermined by an 
external force of destiny (niyati), from which there is no escape; at the other end 
of	the	spectrum	we	find	the	Cārvākas,	the	indian	physicalists,	for	whom	the	most	
probable explanation for the existence of the universe is a series of random 
events.	The	Cārvākas	 reject	 both	 the	 law	of	karma	and	 the	 concept	of	destiny	
because implicit in these notions is a view of existence as inherently purposeful 
(Bhattacharya 2011). The latter view is not unlike that of some contemporary 
libertarians	who,	drawing	on	the	findings	of	quantum	mechanics,	argue	that	the	
statistical probabilities that characterize events at the subatomic level extend to 
the everyday realm of human experience: actions, though biologically and psy-
chologically conditioned, and constrained by the norms of social conduct, are 
not strictly causally determined (Kane 1996, 1999; Wallace 2011).
 It is worth noting from the outset that causal determinism was far less an issue 
of	concern	for	 the	historical	Buddha	than	the	fatalism	of	 the	Ājīvikas.	in	a	dis-
course	on	“The	Fruits	of	the	ascetic	life”	(Sāmaññaphala	Sutta),	the	Buddha	is	
particularly	concerned	to	reject	the	view	of	Makkhali	Gosāla,	who,	by	removing	
all trace of effort from human action, renders the ethical life meaningless: neither 
defilement	nor	purification	have	any	cause	or	condition,	no	action	is	voluntarily	
undertaken either by oneself or by another, and, generally speaking, humans lack 
power, energy, and steadfastness; it is simply their lot in life to experience pain 
and pleasure in a manner beyond their control (DN2.19–20, in Walshe 1987, 
pp. 94ff.; Meyers 2014, pp. 62ff.). In condemning this view, the Buddha not only 
emphasizes	the	reality	of	karmic	action	but	also	the	efficacy	of	individual	effort.	
To those who claim that nothing is done either by oneself or another, the Buddha 
responds	by	pointing	out	the	inconsistency	of	such	statements:	taking	a	first	step	
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in articulating any view whatsoever shows that there is an element of initiative, 
that	one	either	strives	to	overcome	some	resistance	or	to	reach	the	sort	of	reflec-
tive equilibrium that comes with understanding and insight (AN.6.38, in Bodhi 
2012, p. 901).
	 Should	this	rejection	of	fatalism	be	taken	to	mean	that	the	Buddha	is	champion-
ing freedom of the will? More importantly, is there a notion of personal autonomy 
at work in the Buddha’s clear admonition to his followers to jettison the extremes 
of both determinism and indeterminism, and devote themselves instead to an 
ethical life in the pursuit of liberation? It would appear that the picture of the 
ordinary human condition, mired in ignorance and moved by short- term pragmatic 
goals, precludes such a notion of personal freedom. The evaluative attitude implicit 
in this complex analysis of cognitive and affective states, however, seems to 
suggest otherwise. Clearly, an expression of self- concern and concern about the 
consequences of one’s actions is a ubiquitous feature of Buddhist teachings. 
Indeed, while the value placed on shame and apprehension suggests that the 
Buddha favors a conception of responsibility and moral self- regard for those pursu-
ing the Eightfold Path, such a perspective is not ultimate (see Meyers’ 2014 deft 
analysis	 of	 this	 view).	Specifically,	morally	 reactive	 attitudes,	whether	unwhole-
some (e.g., anger and hatred) or wholesome (shame and apprehension), are still 
impersonal mental factors. But, like the complex notion of disposition (cetanā), 
they are also self- referential mental states: “they presuppose the notion of oneself 
as a morally responsible agent” (Meyers 2014, p. 63). Is this conception of moral 
agency self- referentiality constitutive or is it merely an emergent feature of these 
mental states? Are our choices and the sense of control and ownership of action 
illusory or is agency built into the very fabric of lived experience?
 Agency, choice, and self- referentiality are complex notions with a rich and 
contested	history	of	interpretation.	Some	attention	to	Western	theories	of	inten-
tionality, the will, and motivation for action, then, is necessary if we are to make 
any progress in clarifying whether, and in what way, we can make sense of the 
Buddhist	conception	of	selfless	agency.	This	contrasting	analysis	must	recognize	
that while Western and Buddhist ethical discourses are embedded in their own 
intellectual histories, there is no neutral stand from which to assess their merits 
and possible limitations. While contemporary philosophers do address meta-
ethical questions, historically the paucity of inquiries into the nature of ethics in 
Buddhist philosophy makes the matter all the more complicated. By noting this 
absence	(first	pointed	out	in	Siderits	1987),	i	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	Bud-
dhists either deny or doubt the possibility of moral knowledge. Nor do I mean to 
endorse the sort of moral skepticism championed by Mackie (1977), which says 
that judging a particular action morally permissible is simply a statement about 
one’s	 participation	 in	 a	 specific	 way	 of	 life,	 Buddhist	 or	 non-	Buddhist.	 i	 do,	
however, share the generally Kantian line of argumentation, which says that 
there are better and worse ends, and thus better and worse ways of achieving 
those ends depending on the criteria that we adopt (Kant 1993).
 As I already noted, efforts to capture the scope of Buddhist ethics are mired 
in disagreements, mainly between those who favor a virtue ethical model, on 
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account of the presence of a rich catalogue of virtues and of practices conducive 
to their mastery (Keown 2001), and those who advance consequentialist inter-
pretations,	owing	mainly	to	the	identification	of	happiness	and	the	elimination	of	
suffering	as	key	elements	in	a	comprehensive	list	of	factors	that	define	wellbeing	
(Goodman	2009).	Efforts	to	map	out	the	theoretical	structure	of	Buddhist	ethics	
in	sui	generis	terms—and	thus	to	steer	clear	of	both	consequentialist	and	virtue	
ethical	models—have	so	far	gestured	in	 the	direction	of	moral	phenomenology	
as the basis for the tradition’s normative claims: only the experience of enlight-
ened beings can serve as a criterion for moral blame or praiseworthiness (see 
Garfield	2010,	2014).	i	have	no	intention	to	weigh	in	on	this	debate,	relevant	as	
it	may	 be	 to	 the	 broader	 question	 of	whether	 a	 specific	 conception	 of	 agency	
underwrites the Buddhist path all the way to awakening or only up to a point 
(namely, the moment immediately preceding it). Of course, this question 
assumes that we know what kind of agency, if any, enlightened beings exhibit, 
an assumption that lies at the heart of yet another controversy, about the very 
nature	and	possibility	of	enlightened	agency	(see	Garfield	2006;	Finnigan	2011).
	 let	us,	 then,	briefly	consider	the	concept	of	the	will.	an	integral	part	of	the	
Western vocabulary, captured by such ubiquitous statements as “Did you do that 
of	your	own	free	will?”—the	idea	of	will	occurs	in	the	classical	worlds	of	neither	
india	nor	Greece.	For	aristotle,	who	provides	much	of	the	technical	philosophi-
cal vocabulary for virtue ethics, voluntary action is conveyed by the less ambig-
uous concept of deliberative desire (bouleutikê orexis), which captures what it 
means for an action to be within our power. For an action to be deliberately and 
effectively undertaken, desire and reason must converge: it is only when reason 
is desiderative (orekticos nous) and desire is thoughtful or deliberative (orexis 
dianoetike) that we are in a position to make informed decisions (NE.VI.2, 
1139b4, in Aristotle 1999, p. 87; Murphy 2001). When these two work in 
concert they give rise to the more capacious idea of moral purpose (prohairesis). 
In classical India, there are different avenues of volitional pursuit, typically 
classed alongside material (artha), affective (kāma), social (dharma), and ulti-
mately emancipatory (mokṣa) ends. These ends are not necessarily continuous. 
The	ethical	life,	centered	on	the	first	three	aims,	is	almost	entirely	dispensed	with	
in	the	generally	spiritual	and	otherworldly	quest	of	upaniṣadic	lore.	if	aristotle	
heeds	 the	 Socratic	 dictum	 ‘knowledge	 is	 virtue,’	 the	 upaniṣadic	 sage	
Yājñavalkya	is	proleptically	Humean	in	regarding	morality	as	the	play	of	emo-
tions over reason. The early Buddhist conception of the ethical life, likewise, 
shares	 in	 this	 upaniṣadic	 impulse	 to	 transcend	 all	 inclination,	 desire,	 and	
emotion in the pursuit of the higher, if still self- referentially constituted, goal of 
liberation (see Bilimoria et al. 2007, pp. 40ff.).
	 The	idea	of	‘will’	as	a	distinct	faculty	occurs	for	the	first	time	in	the	writings	
of	St.	augustine.	in	On Free Will (De libero arbitrio),	St.	augustine	sets	out	to	
address the problem of theodicy by the introduction of a new faculty, free will 
(liberum arbitrium), which alone is responsible for moral acts being deemed 
praiseworthy or blameworthy.4	 an	 omniscient	 and	 omnibenevolent	 God,	 as	
creator of the world, cannot be the cause for the primal fall from grace that 
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marks	the	human	condition	(according	to	the	old	Hebrew	myth	of	the	Fall	from	
Eden).	 Hence,	 the	 invention	 of	 a	 new	 faculty,	 the	 will,	 capable	 of	 producing	
uncaused	free	action—that	is,	action	that	is	not	accountable	in	terms	of	natural	
events	and	processes	(see	Stump	2001).	But	he	also	uses	the	term	voluntas (‘the 
will’),	which	he	adopts	from	Cicero	and	especially	Seneca,	who	use	it	to	refer	to	
the	Stoic	manner	of	assenting	to	a	given	proposition.	For	the	Stoics,	this	assent	
to propositions of the sort, “No man can compel you to receive what is false,”5 
has moral valence. Thus, to the extent that Augustine’s use of ‘voluntas’ captures 
the notion that we morally assent to various propositions, his understanding of 
agency	 is	 ultimately	 continuous	 with	 the	 Greek	 conception	 of	 moral	 purpose	
(prohairesis),	especially	as	it	finds	articulation	in	Epictetus.	With	one	caveat:	the	
Stoic	and	Christian	conceptions	of	human	nature	are	radically	different.	For	the	
Stoics,	who	take	human	nature	to	be	ultimately	pure,	pursuing	the	moral	life	is	
basically living in accordance with right reason (not to be confused with the 
(kantian)	 idea	of	a	morality	grounded	 in	 rationality).	as	Seneca	so	eloquently	
puts it in Epistulae morales, the pursuit of such moral ends is predicated on the 
notion that “conduct cannot be right unless the will to act is right” (1917–1925, 
XCV, pp. 56ff.). For Augustine, the ‘right will to act’ becomes ‘free will,’ not as 
a condition for the possibility of right attitudes of the mind (habitus animi), but 
as a necessary condition of the justice of divine retribution (see Rist 2001, 
pp. 34ff., for a detailed discussion).
 Clearly, nothing resembling the Augustinian conception of a free will tied to 
divine justice is to be found in Indian philosophy. Karma, or the reward and pun-
ishment for action, is the closest we come to a conception of justice. But this is 
cosmic, rather than divine, justice: karmic consequences depend on the universality 
of the causal principle of dependent arising, not on uncaused divine judgment.
 The more pressing question, however, is whether the idea of free will is com-
patible with determinism, given a conception of the world as causally ordered. 
Here,	i	want	to	draw	on	Stoic	thought	again	as	providing	a	better	basis	to	con-
ceptualize	the	Buddhist	conception	of	moral	agency.	The	Stoic	emphasis	on	the	
causal antecedents of mental states does not mean that they are externally neces-
sitated (Long 2002, p. 28). The occurrence of mental states may be causally gov-
erned, but their intelligibility is not: the latter requires assent, the only criterion 
of individuation that marks a mental state as mine, as occurring in my mental 
stream. It is the volition manifest in assenting, thus, that serves as the basis for 
Stoic	conceptions	of	personal	identity	and	moral	agency.	But	assenting	is	not	the	
same as judging. Evaluative judgments may intrude, but the entire scope of the 
Stoic	life	is	to	bracket	them,	to	realize	(with	Epictetus)	that	“death	is	nothing	ter-
rible,	 else	 it	would	 have	 seemed	 so	 even	 to	Socrates;	 rather	 it	 is	 the	 idea	 that	
death	is	terrible	that	is	terrible”	(Encheiridion,	5,	in	Hard	2014,	p.	288).
	 This	Stoic	conception	of	the	moral	purpose	(prohairesis), indeed, is not unlike 
the role assigned to cetanā (‘disposition’ or ‘volition’)6 in the canonical Buddhist 
literature. Variously rendered as ‘will,’ ‘volition,’ ‘intention,’ ‘motivation,’ ‘cona-
tion,’ ‘drive,’ ‘stimulus,’ ‘determination,’ ‘effort,’ ‘choice,’ and ‘resolve,’ ‘cetanā’ 
is typically the sort of bodily, verbal, and mental activity one performs either on 
826 08 Buddhist 08.indd   97 24/5/16   11:30:55
98  C. Coseru
one’s own or conditioned by others (AN.II.158, in Bodhi 2012, pp. 563ff.). I can 
either voluntarily raise my arm or have it raised by another, as a referee would 
upon	declaring	the	winner	of	a	boxing	match.	Similarly,	i	can	either	think	through	
an issue and volunteer an opinion or ponder a question and offer a response. Thus, 
I can say with certainty that my response to a question is causally determined by 
external factors. But this determinist picture of agency is too simplistic to capture 
the complexity of intersubjective relations (the sort of relations that, as already 
noted,	Strawson	has	in	mind	when	he	suggests	that	participant	reactive	attitudes	are	
indispensable to an account of moral agency and responsibility). My response 
might be solicited by a question, but that a string of sounds registers as a question 
requires a complex set of interpretive, evaluative, and analytic skills that can only 
be constituted as reasons. It is our responsiveness to reasons prompted by valuing 
judgments—of	the	sort	that	extol	the	cultivation	of	certain	mental	states	as	whole-
some	and	the	rejection	of	others	as	unwholesome—that	serves	as	conduit	for	verbal	
and mental activity, even when caused by other things.
 The question of freedom and determinism, thus, must consider not whether 
factors relevant to moral assessment can be causally assessed, but whether the 
agent- neutral framework of Buddhist Reductionism is compatible with a concep-
tion of responsibility- entailing moral agency.7
Agency, causation, and the moral domain
Does the Buddhist conception of agency demand a radical reassessment of our 
understanding of voluntary action and of the causal and motivational factors that 
inform, condition, and sanction our valuing judgments? To answer this question, 
we	must	 consider	 the	defining	 experience	 that	 transforms	Siddhartha	Gautama	
from a human being caught in the causal web into the Buddha, an enlightened 
being. This transformative experience becomes at once the source of the Bud-
dhist metaphysical picture of reality and the culmination of all human aspiration 
for genuine freedom. The centerpiece of this metaphysical picture is the causal 
principle of dependent arising (pratītya-samutpāda) and a thoroughly reduction-
ist account of persons, which takes volition to be but one of several contributing 
factors that shape human identity and agency.
 Firmly situated within this causal web, yet unattached to its emerging phe-
nomena, the Buddha can thus declare that we ought to regard any form of sensa-
tion, attention, and consciousness, whether “past, future, or present; internal or 
external; manifest or subtle . . . as it actually is . . . [as]: ‘This is not mine. This is 
not	my	self.	This	is	not	what	i	am’	”	(SN22,	48,	in	Bodhi	2000,	p.	887).	Rather,	
we are told, the arising of each element in the person series is only as condi-
tioned	by	the	presence	of	immediately	preceding,	causally	efficacious	elements:
[D]ependent on the eye and forms, visual- consciousness arises. The meeting
of the three is contact. With contact as condition there is feeling. What one
feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about.
(MN.i.111–112,	in	Ñāṇamoli	and	Bodhi	2001,	p.	203)
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This picture of causality, however, does not entail strict determinism. The 
enlightened being’s actions are not so much causally grounded as conditioned by 
an ongoing series of enabling factors. Unlike the typical ‘if, then’ formula of 
Western	forms	of	sentential	logic,	the	Pāli	canonical	literature	uses	the	locative	
absolute to capture the conditional nature of phenomena: ‘when that, then this.’ 
Hence,	the	central	thesis	(dependent	arising)	that	all	Buddhists	endorse	is:
When this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises. 
When this is absent, that does not come to be. On the cessation of this, that 
ceases.
(See,	e.g.,	MN.ii.32,	in	Ñāṇamoli	and	Bodhi	2001,	p.	655)
It would appear thus that the conception of agency in Buddhism is not that of an 
autonomous, free willing agent or self, but of an embodied and self- referential 
bundle of aggregates. We can thus get on with the business of charting out the 
experiential domain using the ‘when that, then this’ formula: when there is 
touch, then there is feeling, when there is awareness, then there is grasping for 
objects. Can we go as far as to say ‘when there is agency, there is moral respons-
ibility’? The early Buddhist literature, as we have already noted, is unambiguous 
that initiative is essential to moral progress. But the philosophical innovations of 
later	 Mahāyāna	 Buddhism,	 specifically	 the	 doctrine	 of	 ‘emptiness’	 (universal	
metaphysical	 insubstantiality)	 proposed	 by	 Nāgārjuna,	 complicate	 the	 ethical	
project.	By	making	the	agent-	neutral	metaphysical	picture	of	selflessness	indis-
pensable	to	Mahāyāna	Buddhist	ethics,	Śāntideva	describes	a	way	of	living	with	
the practical consequences of actions that effectively lack agency, and thus also 
lack the sort of intersubjective relation that entails moral responsibility.
 This complication is especially problematic when, in the Bodhicaryāvatāra 
(BCa),	 Śāntideva	 (1995),	 drawing	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 dependent	 arising	 and	
momentariness, claims that there is no continuity between agency and the experi-
ence of its consequences “in terms of a unity of the continuum of consciousness” 
(pp. 9, 72). Pressed with the objection that divorcing agency from the experience 
of moral responsibility makes the pursuit of virtues such as compassion for all 
sentient	beings	irrelevant,	Śāntideva	appeals	to	the	‘two	truths’	(ultimate	vs	con-
ventional) framework of Madhyamaka (‘Middle Way’) dialectic to make an even 
more radical claim: from the perspective of ultimate truth, the embodiment of 
such perfections as wisdom and compassion lacks the intentionality, aboutness 
or directness of ordinary (conventionally understood) mental states. In response 
to the crucially critical question: “for whom is there compassion if no being 
exists?”	(BCa.9.75),	Śāntideva	contends	that	so	long	as	the	delusion—that	there	
is a task to be done (e.g., bringing sentient beings to the realization of the truth 
of	emptiness)—persists,	the	illusion	of	effort	persists	too	(BCa.9.76).
	 Thus,	when	 ethicists	 like	 Śāntideva	 reject	 even	 this	minimal	 conception	 of	
agency as the ground for moral and mental cultivation, the Buddhist ethical 
project reaches an impasse. If there is no agent, and if actions are merely 
transient events arising within a continuum of causally interconnected states, 
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what explains the phenomenal character of experience? Touch, after all, is not 
generic	contact,	but	an	active	and	firm	grip.	awareness	is	not	bare	wakefulness,	
but the sense of being present here and now. And compassion is no mere feeling 
for others, but empathetic self- disclosure in the presence of others. Furthermore, 
the capacity for self- regulation that grounds our moral sense presupposes that we 
are not merely self- aware but aware in a way that makes us implicitly responsive 
to action and their consequences. Even if we assume, as the evidence from cog-
nitive neuroscience seems to suggest, that we are psychologically hardwired to 
attribute agency and hold others responsible for their actions, the question why 
such agency- attributing capacities should be accompanied by a moral sense 
remains	to	be	explained	(see	Gray	et al. 2007; Arico et al. 2011).
 Whether the Buddhist no- self view is simply a theoretical construct, derived 
from metaphysical considerations about agency and causality, or a descriptive 
account grounded in the phenomenology of lived experience, matters to our con-
ception of agency and moral responsibility. Compatibilists argue that reduction-
ism about persons is not incompatible with the pursuit of an ethical life. 
Of course, the compatibilist must acknowledge that the conventional practice of 
morality (to which the Buddha offers precepts, inspiring tales, and rules 
of	conduct)	and	Buddhist	metaphysical	doctrine	are	in	conflict	(this	is	precisely	
Siderits’	2008	view).
 Can appealing to the ‘two truths’ framework of Buddhist philosophy solve this 
conflict?	How	is	the	moral	life	to	be	justified	in	terms	that	ultimately	make	no	ref-
erence to anything experiential and intentional? If enlightened agency is no agency 
at all, what makes it desirable? The Buddha’s concern to reject any conception of 
determinism	that	strips	our	efforts	of	causal	efficacy	becomes	all	 the	more	perti-
nent. Indeed, if the Buddhist analysis of experience allows for persons to have the 
kinds of freedom necessary for the pursuit of moral ends, then the principle of 
dependent arising cannot function as a basis for strict causal determinism.
 That agency and moral responsibility are deeply intertwined is obvious when 
we consider the relation between practical deliberation and theorizing about the 
nature of things: the latter looks for causal explanations of events, and ultimately 
finds	them	in	impersonal	elements	and	factors	that	are	constitutive	of	the	natural	
world. This naturalistic picture has no place for concepts like ‘freedom’ and 
‘responsibility.’ But most, if not all, of our most pressing deliberations rest on 
practical	 reasoning	of	 the	sort	 that	asks,	“What	should	i	do?”—and	 then	 looks	
for	the	most	justifiable	course	of	action.	if	such	is	the	case,	then	holding	myself	
responsible for actions that I undertake is integral for their success. That is, 
regardless of whether theoretical reason is able to demonstrate freedom or not, 
practical reason must assume that freedom is possible for the purpose of effective 
action. This Kantian perspective on human agency is motivated by the assump-
tion that the kind of freedom we are supposed to consider (and criticize) is as 
described by libertarians or agent causal theorists. This conception of freedom 
gives agency its spontaneity within the logical space of reasons.
 Do ‘freedom’ and ‘responsibility’ belong in a discourse about causation in the 
natural world? If such discourse does not eliminate consciousness from its ultimate 
826 08 Buddhist 08.indd   100 24/5/16   11:30:56
Freedom from responsibility  101
picture of what there is, then freedom and responsibility are no mere artifacts of 
practical reason, but epistemically objective features of lived experience. If, on the 
other	hand,	we	find	no	room	for	practical	concerns	about	how	best	 to	 live	 in	our	
ultimate	ontology,	then	freedom	and	responsibility	are	confined	exclusively	to	the	
domain of social convention. The Buddhist metaphysical picture of reality, as a 
product of theoretical reason, is devoid of any reference to selves and their con-
cerns, or indeed to anything substantive. At least in principle, the no- self view 
would preclude any robust account of free will and responsibility.
 Yet, Buddhist practice requires the observance of certain norms and the valu-
ation	of	certain	types	of	thought,	speech,	and	action	that	are	considered	beneficial.	
Chief among these is the restraint of unmitigated willful thought, speech, and 
action.	 However,	 this	 valuation,	 and	 the	 psychological	 terms	 in	 which	 it	 is	
expressed, is at odds with an impersonal account of phenomena in causal terms. 
Proposals	 for	 some	 kind	 of	 Buddhist	 compatibilism	 to	 solve	 this	 conflict,	 as	 i	
have	argued elsewhere (Coseru 2017), indirectly render agency in general, and 
moral agency in particular, epiphenomenal. The largely consequentialist 
framework of compatibilism, on my view, cannot give an adequate account of our 
moral institu-tions, and is generally indifferent to the concerns of practical reason.
Which action, whose responsibility?
Now that we have a clearer grasp of why understanding the nature of agency 
matters to morality, we can return to the metaphysical question of what personal 
agency entails. What does it mean to take ourselves as capable of choosing or 
directing our actions in a deliberate way? As it should be obvious, entertaining 
such	a	question	and	 reflecting	on	what	 it	means	 for	 the	alternatives	 it	presents	
(voluntary or intentional behavior vs behavior that is simply caused by a totality 
of causes and conditions) opens up the possibility that reason could serve as a 
causal motive for action. For someone like Kant, this deliberative process does 
not simply inform, but also enacts, the idea of spontaneity (1998, A533/B561, 
p. 533). In short, when we act, as opposed to merely being acted upon by causal 
factors beyond our control, we do so for reasons.
We may dispute the libertarian conception of an unconditioned spontaneity. 
But	 reflection	compels	us	 to	 acknowledge	 its	 epistemic	and	phenomenological	
salience in differentiating between voluntary and involuntary actions. It is, after 
all, a demonstrable truth that how we choose to act (by deliberating about pos-
sible alternatives) makes a difference in how we actually act. Of course, choice 
means that the alternatives so entertained are equally attainable, and that deliber-
ation is effective in charting the range of available possibilities.
The choice to act one way or another is also grounded in all sorts of practical 
considerations. Do we need a conception of free will or even an idea of freedom 
in	a	transcendental	sense	to	ground	our	practical	deliberations?	Those	who	find	
the	kantian	argument—about	the	independence	of	reason	from	the	necessitation	
of	impulses—compelling,	take	the	view	that	we	can	only	be	free	if	we	conceive	
of ourselves as such. But this way of framing the problem confronts us with yet 
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another metaphysical conundrum, in this case about whether conceivability 
entails possibility. It seem intuitively plausible that we can and indeed do con-
ceive of ourselves as free agents, and thus that we do assume freedom for the 
possibility of action. And it is equally plausible that we can conceive of our-
selves as lacking agency by externalizing the causes of our actions (Dennett 
2004, p. 292 entertains this very possibility). This is precisely the strategy that 
informs	 Śāntideva’s	Madhyamaka	 ethics:	 pain,	 anger,	 and	 desire	 simply	 arise	
due to causes and conditions without there being someone for whom the pain is 
sharp or stingy, the anger righteous or impulsive, and the desire wholesome or 
unwholesome, respectively.
 If conceiving of ourselves as free agents challenges the dominant picture of 
the universe as a causally closed physical system, conceiving of ourselves as 
lacking	agency	comes,	it	seems,	at	a	significantly	lesser	cost:	with	human	behav-
ior explainable in terms of either external causes or internal, but subpersonal, 
cognitive processes, we can dispense with the notion of responsibility altogether. 
The utility calculus at the heart of agent- neutral consequentialism compels us to 
make	the	less	expensive	choice:	sacrificing	freedom	also	means	the	end	of	moral	
responsibility. It is no longer the individual but her brain or hormones that pre-
cipitate	action.	However,	counterintuitive	it	may	seem	at	first,	the	no-	self	picture	
is perfectly suited to accommodate this account of personal identity.
	 also	conceivable	is	that	Buddhist	ethical	thinkers	such	as	Śāntideva,	are	less	
concerned with the possibility of freedom in a causally ordered universe (such 
possibility is nonetheless taken to be the modus operandi of all enlightened 
beings), and more with minimizing suffering and/or maximizing happiness for 
all sentient beings. As there is no overarching normative framework and no need 
to demonstrate freedom, ethical conduct is simply a matter of pursuing certain 
pragmatic ends. Most importantly, the rules that regulate the pursuit of such ends 
vary depending on whether one is a novice bodhisattva or a realized Buddhist 
saint. And since Buddhist saints, unlike novice practitioners, are permitted to 
break moral rules in the service of carrying out compassionate actions, they are 
also free from the responsibility such actions entail for the unenlightened. In the 
end, it is precisely this freedom from responsibility, perhaps ironically, that 
makes the bodhisattva ideal the more costly alternative. No responsibility does 
not	 just	mean	no	justification	for	action:	 it	also	means	no	agency,	not	even	for	
the Buddha, who obviously could not have taught, let alone inspired, myriad 
generations to follow in his path.
Notes
1	 See	Caruso	(2012),	Smart	(2006),	and	Wegner	(2002)	for	various	attempts	to	prove	the	
illusory nature of experiences of mental causation. While not conclusive, Nahmias et 
al. (2004) review experimental data that seems to favor compatibilist over incompatibi-
list accounts of free will.
2 Despite the taboo on speaking about ‘the self,’ psychological and moral attitudes form 
an integral part of the Buddhist tradition (see Collins 1982, Ch. 6). Also, despite the 
dominance of the ultraminimalist account of agency developed in the Abhidharma, 
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there	are	good	and	compelling	reasons	to	give	‘Buddhist	personalists’	(pudgalavādins)	
credit for insisting that important features of personhood are ineliminable (see Carpen-
ter 2015; Priestley 1999).
3 The problem with event- causal theories of action is their failure to capture agency alto-
gether, instead reducing it merely to things that happen to us. On this model, there are 
pushes and pulls but no one does anything ever. This is the so- called problem of the 
‘disappearing	agent’	(see	Mele	2003,	Ch.	10;	lowe	2008,	pp.	159ff.;	Steward	2013).
4	 as	Garfield	(2014,	p.	166,	n.1)	notes,	both	compatibilists	and	libertarians	claim	augus-
tine as their source, and both readings are possible.
5	 as	Epictetus	(Hard	2014)	notes	 in	Discourses 1.17, moral agency is grounded in our 
capacity to assent: 
Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man 
compel you to receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you 
have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded.
6 Among the most common translations are ‘will’ (Rhys Davids 1898), ‘volition or cona-
tion’	 (aung	 and	 Rhys	 Davids	 1979),	 ‘choice’	 (keown	 2001),	 ‘volition’	 (Guenther	
1976),	and	‘intention’	(Gombrich	1988;	Heim	2014).	Garfield	(2014)	 thinks	all	argu-
ments in favor of a conception of ‘the will’ in Buddhism are bad arguments because 
they rely on tendentious translations of cetanā as ‘choice’ rather than ‘intent’ or ‘voli-
tion.’	See	also	Repetti	(2010)	for	an	analytic	review	of	Western	discussions	of	free	will	
in Buddhism that focuses on interpretations of the principle of dependent arising, and 
its possible interpretation as endorsing either a soft or hard determinism.
7	 as	 Siderits	 (2008,	 p.	 30)	 notes,	 since	 classical	 indian	 philosophers	 did	 not	 directly	
address this problem, we cannot go to the historical record in search of an answer. 
Instead, the question should be framed in terms of what Buddhists ‘should say, given 
their other commitments.’
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